We consider optimal pricing problems for a product that experiences network effects. Given a price, the sales quantity of the product arises as an equilibrium, which may not be unique. In contrast to previous studies that take a best-case view when there are multiple equilibrium sales quantities, we maximize the seller's revenue assuming that the worst-case equilibrium quantity will arise in response to a chosen price. We compare the best-and worst-case solutions, and provide asymptotic analysis of revenues.
Introduction
In this paper, we consider a pricing problem for a product with network effects. A product exhibits network effects if each individual customer's valuation for the product increases in its overall sales.
In traditional pricing models for a product without network effects, it is common that the sales level (or expected sales level) of the product can be expressed as an explicit single-valued function of its price. The situation is more complicated for a product with network effects. The sales level of such a product influences customers' valuations, and those valuations determine customers' purchasing decisions, which themselves affect the sales level. Consequently, it is natural that, given a price, the sales level for a product with network effects is a solution to a fixed point equation. For a given price, the fixed point equation simply expresses the ''equilibrium condition'' that the sales level that arises must yield customer valuations that themselves induce that same sales level. If the fixed point equation admits multiple solutions (that is, there are multiple equilibria), then for a given price, there may be one fixed point (that is, equilibrium) that is a high sales level and another that is a low sales level. If this is the case, then sales revenues at those two equilibria will differ. When a pricing decision does not uniquely determine demand (even for a deterministic model), the seller is faced with the question of how to formulate and solve a suitable price optimization problem. In this paper, we study these issues for a seller of a single product.
We start with a multinomial logit (MNL) choice model where each customer picks between just two options: (a) buy the product or (b) do not buy the product. A textbook treatment of the MNL model can be found in, e.g., [1] . The MNL model may be viewed as a random utility maximization model, where each customer's utility for the product is comprised of an expected-utility term and a random term. We incorporate network effects by modifying the expected-utility term to depend upon sales. With this, choice probabilities depend upon sales, and the equilibria described above arise as fixed points of the function that, given a price, maps sales levels to choice probabilities.
We will focus on ''worst-case'' settings where the lowest possible sales equilibrium (that is, the smallest fixed point) is assumed to arise in response to an implemented price. Our motivation for this approach is that a seller may be wise to use a formulation that guards against a particularly undesirable market response to its pricing decision.
The questions we address are as follows. (i) What is the seller's optimal price in the worst-case setting and how does it compare to that in a ''best-case'' setting where the highest possible sales equilibrium (that is, the largest fixed point) is assumed to arise in response to a price? (ii) What happens if the seller prices in expectation of a best-case equilibrium but the worst-case equilibrium arises? Conversely, what if the seller prices in expectation of a worst-case equilibrium but the best-case equilibrium arises? (iii) How do revenues in these scenarios depend upon the strength of the network effect? The answer to (ii) can help inform a seller's choice between solving the best-and worst-case formulations by allowing it to evaluate the cost of making an incorrect assumption.
We show that the worst-case problem can be solved via a one-dimensional optimization problem with a unimodal objective function. That problem provides a link between the best-and worst-case formulations, from which we find that the two have the same solution if the network effect is weak but different solutions if the network effect is strong. (The ''strength'' of the network effect depends upon a parameter that governs the extent to which sales affect an individual's expected utility for the product.) We find that if the best-and worst-case problems have different answers, then in the best-case problem the seller sets a higher price and obtains a lower sales level and higher revenue than in the worstcase problem. The difference in revenues in the two cases can be large. For very strong network effects, we prove that the bestcase revenue is roughly proportional to the parameter mentioned above, while the worst-case revenue is roughly proportional to its logarithm.
If the seller is ''misguidedly optimistic'' and sets the price prescribed by the solution of the best-case formulation, but (contrary to the assumption underlying that formulation) the worst-case equilibrium for that price prevails, then the realized revenue may be below what the solution to the best-case formulation suggested it would be and also below what it would have been if the seller had instead implemented the worst-case pricing solution. With a weak network effect, such an issue does not arise because the two formulations have the same solution. However, if the network effect is strong, then the phenomenon is quite pronounced. We prove that the revenue under misguided optimism is roughly proportional to the reciprocal of an expression that is exponential in the parameter that determines the strength of the network effect. Thus, a misguidedly optimistic seller's revenue is almost zero in such settings. If the seller is instead ''incorrectly pessimistic'' and sets the price prescribed by the solution of the worst-case problem in a setting where the best equilibrium prevails, then it turns out that the price obtained from the worst-case formulation yields a unique equilibrium. Nevertheless, the seller would be better off using the best-case price.
To close this section, we provide a very short literature review. The MNL model and its variants have been widely used in the revenue management literature for problems without network effects. For examples and references, see [4, 6, 7, 9, 10] . To draw distinctions with our work, these papers do not consider network effects, and hence do not need to consider (multiple) sales equilibria.
The papers [5] and [11] use the MNL model -modified as described above -in pricing and assortment planning problems with network effects. These papers contain some results regarding (non-)uniqueness of equilibria, but neither focuses on the issue from a decision-making standpoint. [5] considers pricing for products with network effects, but studies only the best-case setting; it does not address the worst-case setting. Other work on MNL models with network effects includes [2, 8] and Section 7.8 of [1] . These studies address the possibility of multiple equilibria, but their focus is quite different from ours. For pointers to the literature on network effects, see [5, 11] .
The presence of multiple equilibria that give different revenues to the seller is similar to a situation that may arise in Stackelberg games, and more generally, bilevel programming problems. In a Stackelberg game, the leader makes a decision and the follower responds with its own optimal decision, but there may be multiple possible values for the follower's optimal decision. This is similar to our problem where the seller sets a price and the market responds with a sales level, but there may be multiple values for that level. In Stackelberg games, this may be addressed with ''optimistic'' and ''pessimistic'' formulations akin to the best-and worst-case approaches herein. See [3] .
The model
Consider a seller who must set the price p for a single product. Demand is given by an MNL model, modified to incorporate network effects. To begin, we describe this demand model, which is the same as the one in [5] specialized to a single product. Each individual customer has a valuation U = v + ϵ for the product where v is the same across the population of customers, but ϵ varies across the population of customers. We assume v = y − p + αq, where y is a constant, q is the sales quantity of the product, and α ≥ 0 is a network effect sensitivity parameter. The value a customer gets from the product increases in q. We may view α as reflecting the strength of the network effect. If α is large, then a customer's valuation is quite sensitive to sales q, and the network effect is strong. If α is small, then a customer's valuation is less sensitive to q, and the network effect is weak. We may also allow α < 0 (so valuations decrease in q) in which case the analysis is the same as that for α ∈ [0, 4] below. We assume throughout that y ≥ 0. For discussion of settings with negative y, see the remark after Lemma 5.1 in Section 5.
We define v 0 = 0 and assume that each individual customer has valuation U 0 = v 0 + ϵ 0 for the no-purchase option (not buying the product) and that ϵ 0 varies across the population of customers. We consider a ''fluid model'' of demand, and for simplicity, scale the size of the population of customers to 1. In such a fluid model, the fraction of customers whose ϵ and ϵ 0 are in any particular range (and, in view of the assumption of a population of size 1, also the number of customers whose ϵ and ϵ 0 are in that range) is the same as the probability that the ϵ and ϵ 0 of an individual customer are in that range. As in the usual logit model, we assume ϵ and ϵ 0 are independent Gumbel random variables for each customer. It follows from standard results for the MNL model that the probability a typical customer will buy the product when the price is p is
From our assumption of a fluid model with a population of size 1,
The seller wishes to maximize its revenue π(p, q) = pq. The seller implements price p, and the market responds with sales quantity q that satisfies (1) . The heart of the issue we address is that for a given price p, it is possible that there are multiple quantities that satisfy (1) and the associated revenues may differ greatly. That is, for given p, it is possible that there are
. See [5] for an optimistic (best-case) approach where the revenue maximization problem is solved while implicitly assuming that for any price p, the sales quantity that arises is the one with the highest revenue among those that satisfy (1) . The best-case assumption in [5] is implicit because that paper does not present a formulation that explicitly differentiates between best and worst cases, but rather presents and solves a formulation that turns out to be equivalent to a best-case formulation. Herein, we mainly focus on a pessimistic (worst-case) setting in which for any price p, the sales quantity that arises is the one with the lowest revenue among those that satisfy (1).
For price p, define Q (p) to be the set of q that satisfy (1),
With this, we can restate (1) as follows:
The best-case pricing problem (in essence studied in [5] ) is
Likewise, the worst-case pricing problem (the main topic of this paper) is
(WC) Lemma 3.1 establishes Q (p) is finite for each p. So, the maximum over q in (BC) and the minimum over q in (WC) are attained. As we will see later, there may be no optimal solution to sup p π(p) in (WC). In such cases, we must be satisfied with an ϵ-optimal
Preliminary analysis
In this section, we provide insight into when multiple sales equilibria exist, and also outline an approach from [5] to solve the best-case problem. The approach will also be an ingredient in our procedure for solving the worst-case problem. To begin, for
For any given sales quantity q ∈ (0, 1), some algebra shows that p = p(q) is the unique price for which (2) holds. For q ∈ (0, 1), we have that q ∈ Q (p) if and only if p(q) = p. This does not preclude the existence of some other value (say q ′ ) such that p(q) and q ′ also together satisfy (2) . Fig. 1 plots p(q) for an example. (We explain the points BC, WC, MO later.) The (p, q)-pairs that satisfy (2) are the points in twodimensional space on the graph of p(q). Thus, the number of equilibria for a price p is simply the number of times a horizontal line at height p intersects p(q). If p is between p L and p H in the figure, then there are three q that satisfy (2) . The best-case approach assumes sales will be the largest of these three. If sales instead turn out to be the smallest of the three (consistent with the worst-case assumption), then sales -and revenue -will be much lower. For instance, in Fig. 1 , if the price isp (which, in this example, is optimal for (BC)), then the largest sales quantity that could arise isq ≈ 0.90, while the smallest that could arise is q ‡ ≈ 0.05.
The following lemma describes the structure of p(q). In the interest of space, we omit the proof, which follows from (3) and simple calculus. So, we hereafter assume α > 4.
We close this section with an approach for solving (BC). Definẽ
and consider the maximization problem
We can summarize our results for (BC) with the following. Proofs of this and subsequent results are in Section 5. The essence of the above is that to solve (BC), it suffices to solve the optimization problem (P0) where the decision variable is the quantity. Lemma 5.1 of Section 5 establishes thatπ (q) is strictly unimodal. Thus, the unique maximizerq ofπ (q) can be found efficiently. If there are no network effects (α = 0), thenπ (q) is, in fact, concave; for discussion of this result for problems without network effects, see Section 2.1 of [6] .
Main results
In this section we solve (WC), and make comparisons with (BC).
We then consider what happens if the seller has an incorrect belief about which equilibrium will prevail, and study how the strength of the network effect, as measured by α, affects the seller's revenue in different scenarios.
Let q M be the larger of the two q for which (p L , q) satisfies (2); see part 2(b) of Lemma 3.1 and Fig. 1 . Observe that q
The following, which describes the solution to (WC), is our first main result. Recall thatq is the optimal solution to (P0).
Theorem 4.1.
then there does not exist an optimal solution to (WC).

For any
Proposition 3.2 and Theorem 4.1 reveal a simple relationship between the best-and worst-case problems. If the optimal solutioñ q to (P0) is larger than q M , then the two problems have the same solution. On the other hand, ifq is less than q M , then an optimistic seller will charge more than will a pessimistic seller, and the optimist will expect to obtain a lower sales quantity but higher revenue than will the pessimist. This occurs because the pessimist avoids any price for which there exists a ''very low'' equilibrium sales quantity, even if there is also a high equilibrium sales quantity associated with that price. This leads the pessimist to charge a lower price than the optimist. The optimist is not concerned with the existence of a low quantity associated with a price so long as there is also high quantity. An example withq < q M is depicted in Fig. 1 . The points labeled BC and WC correspond to the (p, q)-pairs obtained from problems (BC) and (WC). Fig. 2 shows how π and π vary with the parameter α, which measures the strength of the network effect. For small α, we have π = π. This can be explained by the fact that for such α we M are proved in Lemma 5.5.) As α increases, both π and π increase because, all else equal, customers value the product more. The figure suggests that π grows more rapidly than π. In fact, π is asymptotically proportional to α while π is asymptotically proportional to log α. This is made precise in the next theorem. In preparation, recall that derives from the fact that the seller charges a much higher price in (BC) than in (WC) while obtaining almost the same sales level.
To build intuition for Theorem 4.2, first consider the best case.
For simplicity, suppose y = 0. From the proof we see that for large α, the optimal price is roughly p H = p(q H ), which is close to α − log α, and the associated best-case quantity is roughly q H , which is close to 1. This yields a revenue of roughly (α−log α)×1 ∼ α as in part (i) of the theorem. To see why the optimal price is roughly α − log α, note that a lower price will increase sales, but not by much because the sales level is already close to 1. This suggests it is suboptimal to price below α − log α. It can be seen in Fig. 1 that pricing higher than p H yields a very low sales quantity (smaller than q L , which is itself close to 0 when α is large). Why is it suboptimal to charge a very high price and get very low sales?
n . So, a very high price of roughly α n yields a quantity of roughly exp(−α n ) and a revenue of roughly α n exp(−α n ), which is lower than the revenue from pricing at α − log α.
Pricing at α − log α also yields another equilibrium quantity that is less than q L (near 0), making it a poor choice in the worstcase problem. L are roughly equal to log α (see the proof of Lemma 5.4) and 1 respectively, yielding the worst-case revenue of about log α in the theorem. Prices below roughly log α and above roughly α−log α yield a unique equilibrium but are suboptimal in the worst case for the same reasons (see previous paragraph) that they are suboptimal in the best case.
To close this section, we address the question: what happens if the seller is ''misguidedly optimistic'' and solves (BC), but upon implementing the prescribed price, the worst corresponding sales quantity arises? We may similarly ask what if the seller is ''incorrectly pessimistic'' and sets the price obtained from solving (WC), but the best corresponding sales quantity arises?
We start with the simpler case of incorrect pessimism. Suppose that for any given price, the best equilibrium sales level will actually prevail, but that the seller believes incorrectly that the worst equilibrium will prevail. Let q † = max{q : q ∈ Q (p)} be the largest sales quantity that can arise from the worst-case price p. The incorrectly pessimistic seller implements price p and subsequently the sales level q † arises. The seller obtains revenue Fig. 1 . Hence, the actual sales level will not differ from that predicted by the solution to (WC), and the seller will not realize it was incorrect in its pessimism and will obtain revenue π. Next we turn to misguided optimism. Suppose that for any given price, the worst equilibrium will actually prevail, but the seller believes incorrectly that the best equilibrium will prevail. Let q ‡ = min{q : q ∈ Q (p)} be the smallest sales quantity that can arise from the best-case price p. The misguidedly optimistic seller sets price p and then sales level q ‡ arises. The seller obtains revenue Fig. 1 ). So, q ‡ will be smaller than q. If optimism is much lower than those in the best-and worst-case solutions. To understand the effect misguided optimism has on revenue, Fig. 2 plots π ‡ against the network effect parameter α. Note there is a discontinuity in π ‡ at α ≈ 4.8, which is the value of α whereq moves from above q M to below q M . When this happens, q ‡ shifts from coinciding withq to being smaller than q L . The figure shows that π ‡ coincides with π and π when α is small, consistent with the discussion above. In addition, the figure suggests that π ‡ approaches 0 quickly as α grows. This is made precise in Theorem 4.3, which shows that π ‡ converges to 0 at a rate that is exponential in α. When deciding whether to use (BC) or (WC), a seller may combine Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 to make rough comparisons of the costs of incorrect pessimism and misguided optimism.
Proofs and auxiliary results
Proof of Proposition 3.2. For each p we have that (i) for q ∈ (0, 1) we have q ∈ Q (p) if and only if p(q) = p, and
Lemma 5.1 establishes that there is a unique optimal solutioñ q to (P0) and thatq > q H . We next show that (p(q),q) is an optimal solution (BC). For arbitrary price p, let q † (p) be the unique maximizer in the problem max q {pq :
where the inequality holds becauseq maximizes p(q)q. For p = p(q), it is apparent that q † (p(q)) =q, and the weak inequality in (5) becomes an equality. Thus, (p(q),q) is an optimal solution to (BC). For uniqueness of the optimal solution to (BC), consider any price p ̸ = p(q). Then the inequality in (5) must be strict, or else we would get a contradiction thatq is the unique maximizer of
By Lemma 3.1, we have that 
Here, the supremum in (WC) and A 1 is not attained, but an ϵ-optimal solution is given by (p ϵ , q ϵ ). To see this, note that the set Q (p ϵ ) is the singleton {q
is a strictly unimodal function on (0, 1) with a unique maximizerq ∈ (0, 1). In addition,q > q H .
Proof. The first and second derivatives ofπ (q) arẽ
To prove the lemma it suffices to show (i)π
follows easily from (6), so we need only establish (i) and (ii).
We begin with (i). Note g(q) := 1 q(1−q) 2 is decreasing for q ∈ (0, 1/3), increasing for q ∈ (1/3, 1), and attains its minimum of 27/4 = g(1/3) at q = 1/3. Also, lim q↓0 g(q) = lim q↑1 g(q) = ∞. Recall that α > 4, so 2α > 27/4. It now follows from (7) that π ′′ (1/3) > 0. Hence,π ′′ (q) = 0 has exactly two solutions, q 1 < q 2 .
Moreover,π ′′ (q) < 0 on (0, q 1 ) and (q 2 , 1), andπ ′′ (q) > 0 on (q 1 , q 2 ). Recall from Lemma 3.1 that q H and q L are the solutions to p ′ (q) = 0, and therefore α =
we have q
This implies q L ∈ (q 1 , q 2 ) and q H ∈ (q 2 , 1), from which (i) now follows.
because y ≥ 0 > −1. We will complete the proof of (ii) by showing thatπ ′ (q) > 0 for q ∈ (0, 1/2). Because α > 4, we have from (6) thatπ
Hence, it suffices to establish that f (q) > 0 for q ∈ (0, 1/2). Note 
We − log(2α − 1).
Proof. Consider q
. From (6), we haveπ ′ (q 
where the final equality above uses q
Note that y/log α → 0. 
− log (2α − 1) for sufficiently large α. It follows that 
